One of the things that always stuns me about seeing these all-too-frequent disasters unfold is how often we’re presented with realizations of “Damn, I hadn’t thought of that.”, which is why exercises like the one discussed in my previous post are so important. Going back through the findings in the report, many things struck me with that feeling, such as the lack of cooperation among government agencies that wouldn’t traditionally consider themselves vital to our national security, like the Evironmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Health and Human Services :
ISSUE – Challenges of a multiple nuclear scenario exercise (Reported by: EPA LNO)
DISCUSSION: Having a multiple nuclear release scenario was extremely challenging. In general, both players and scenario writers probably underestimated the tremendous national importance of the Comanche Peak release. A nuclear power plant has never gone beyond “Alert”, so one actually releasing radiation and going to “General Emergency” is extremely significant, as important as Three Mile Island or Chernobyl in the public’s mind. Some of the response personnel left the response operations at the nuclear plant to take care of the nuclear detonation, but this may not necessarily be the way it would play out. Second, the nuclear detonation brings other problems on a national scale that weren’t addressed including additional devices trying to come into the US and perhaps target cities demanding DOE attention that might stress DOE as well as EPA’s response capability.
RECOMMENDATION: The multiple nuclear release scenario allowed for evaluation of (and to varying degrees exposed some confusion about) various federal plans and interagency agreements. This was something that needed to be exercised and had never made it to the forefront until this exercise. EPA , DOE, HHS and other agencies need to better assess their capabilities to respond to multiple nuclear incidents and to better coordinate their roles, resources, and capabilities under existing plans and most importantly, under the final NRP, as it is developed.
RECOMMENDED ACTION OFFICE: Future exercises should include this challenge to enable response agencies to further assess resources needs and better refine their roles in an actual radiological response.
Or who’s in charge of monitoring radioation levels in the aftermath of a nuclear attack.
ISSUE – EPA needs to develop significant new capability if it will be tasked in the future to monitor the public for radiation and to decontaminate significant numbers of people. (Reported by: EPA LNO)
DISCUSSION: Population monitoring and decontamination of the public for radiation is not historically seen as an EPA task. During both TOPOFF 2 and UD-04 EPA was given and accepted mission assignments involving monitoring the public. Further, in UD-04 EPA was assigned — and accepted the lead for assisting the State of Texas in the set up and operation of seven decontamination stations capable of handling several thousand people. This has been traditionally thought of as primarily a DOE/HHS-lead activity. EPA needs to do significant work to better prepare response personnel and contractors to perform this type of work if tasked to perform some of these missions in the future. Additionally, resources to do this on a large scale would certainly be an issue.
RECOMMENDATION: Under existing plans, and more importantly, under the new NRP, EPA’s role with respect to public monitoring and public decontamination, should be clarified vis a vis DOE and HHS. If it is agreed that EPA should be prepared for this type of mission, the Agency will need to develop plans, procedures and contractor capability to perform it.
RECOMMENDED ACTION OFFICE: DHS/FEMA should work with EPA, DOE and HHS to codify all three agencies’ respective roles in public monitoring and decontamination. If EPA will be tasked with this work in future, it should begin developing an expanded capability immediately.
Or the challenges in maintaining security clearances in a crisis.
Current disaster operations plans do not include plans for secure communications as part of the standard deployment package. This could be a problem if the event involved a nuclear, biological, radiological or nuclear weapon or other terrorist action. Region VI does not have adequate secure communications to handle the kind of information we would need. Region VI has secure communications only via high-frequency (HF) radio. Region VI does not have secure video-teleconference (VTC) capability. Very few of our information technology staff have security clearances. None of the reservist personnel who staff disaster field offices have security clearances. In a catastrophic emergency, we may be short full-time staff with security clearances. There is also a need for interoperability secure communications between DoD and DHS. The DCE’s “key” failed, and FEMA was unable to recover it for him. The DCE had to drive several hundred miles to Fifth US Army to obtain another key for his STU-capable telephone.
[. . .]
ISSUE – Ineffective Exchange of Classified Information. (Reported by: TSA)
DISCUSSION: Significant classified exercise information was posted by USNORTHCOM to SIPRNet web pages, or moved via SIPRNet email, and was inaccessible within the TSA’s Transportation Security Coordination Center – degrading the ability to set overall incident-related priorities. Although TSA expects to have this capability in the future, all supporting and supported agency centers, at every level of government, must also be capable of accessing this system in their Emergency Operations Centers.
RECOMMENDATION: Each agency requires access and the ability to rapidly exchange classified information. Providing connectivity to the SIPRNet offers an obvious means for the rapid exchange of SECRET information. To establish a near-term common joint information capability an effort should be implemented to expedite establishment of SIPRNet accounts to all management agencies that require access to classified information. An established utility could be classified by using the JRIES on the SIPRNet. Regardless of the system to be used, DHS should designate the system that each agency must acquire to ensure an agency-wide capability exists.
Or (this one really gets me) making sure the government has adequate stockpiles of non-traditional supplies like clean clothes.
Victims contaminated by radioactive fallout, chemicals, or biological agents must discard their contaminated clothes at the decontamination station. Decontamination stations will likely run out of clothes to issue in a catastrophic incident. DHS or the states should stockpile disposable clothing, e.g., FEMA could stockpile clothing at Territorial Logistics Centers. Private sector clothing production and distribution centers should be included in an inventory of critical resources.
Considering that the government failed so completely at accomplishing the obvious tasks assigned to them, I’m doubtful that the issues above are on anyone’s radar.